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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000291

SENSITIVE
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STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA
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EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
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SUBJECT: FSC NOVEMBER 26: GEORGIA JOINS CONSENSUS ON
DECISION FOR MINISTERIAL

REF: A. USOSCE 0274
[1](#)B. STATE 116705

[1](#)1. (SBU) Summary: Georgia reluctantly joined consensus on a draft Ministerial decision that summarizes the FSC's 2008 work and tasks it to submit progress reports to the 2009 Ministerial. At issue was a reference to the Georgia-Russia conflict in August 2008, which Russia wanted described as the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict. The only language acceptable to all 56 pS was "the conflict in August 2008." This action means that all FSC-related issues are closed and endorsed for transmission to Helsinki.

[1](#)2. (SBU) Maj Gen Paul Schafer, the director of strategy at U.S. European Command, offered a well-received presentation on the command's "strategy for active security." In the working groups Germany proposed revisions to the Russian proposal for a single deadline for submission of Vienna Document defense planning information. Estonia issued a revised draft decision for the agenda and modalities of the March 2009 cyber security workshop. Washington, guidance is requested whether to join a UK-led "statement of concern" over new Russian visa procedures (see para 15). End summary.

Georgia Joins Consensus

[1](#)3. (SBU) Acting on last minute instructions from capital, Georgia (Giorgadze) announced it would reluctantly join consensus of the draft Ministerial Council decision on FSC issues (MC.DD/6/08/Rev.4). At issue was the description of the FSC Security Dialogue earlier in the autumn session of the Georgia-Russia war in August 2008, which Russia insisted

be described as the "Georgia-South Ossetia" conflict. Despite its continuing belief that Russia's invasion and continuing occupation of Georgia should be described as such, Georgia agreed to language that would simply commend the discussion in the FSC of "the armed conflict in August 2008."

¶4. (SBU) Russia's (Ulyanov) response to Georgia's decision was cool, although it offered to continue the discussion at future meetings while objecting to the "tenor" of Georgian remarks. The chair, Finland (Kangaste), predicted to USDel that Georgia would make an interpretive statement at the Ministerial in Helsinki the first week in December. An accompanying FSC decision to forward the draft Ministerial decision to the Ministerial was adopted without discussion (FSC.DEC/15/08).

EUCOM Strategy for Active Security

¶5. (SBU) Maj Gen Paul Schafer, USAF, the director of strategy, policy and assessments (J-5) at U.S. European Command, explained the command's "strategy for active security," which is designed to defend the U.S. while creating and maintaining an environment that supports the strategic interests of the U.S., its Allies, and partners in Europe, including the Russian Federation. Schafer described potential threats in the EUCOM region, including terrorism, interruption of energy supplies, cyber attacks, and regional instability in the Caucasus, Balkans, Turkey, and the Levant.

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He then explained how the continuing forward presence of U.S. forces, albeit greatly reduced from Cold War levels, coupled with enduring regional partnerships facilitate security cooperation, exercises and training, contingency planning and crisis response.

¶6. (SBU) In response to questions from France and Germany, Schafer said EUCOM welcomed the EU's contributions to security in the region, noting the EULEX ("EU law enforcement") mission in Kosovo. While EUCOM did not, he said, have extensive contact with OSCE, the command followed closely and supported the OSCE's work. Schafer, in response to Finland, said EUCOM took the growing cyber threat seriously and worked with U.S. Strategic Command to deter and prevent cyber attacks.

¶7. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) noted the EUCOM area of responsibility included the entire Russian Federation. What did that mean for Russia and for EUCOM? Schafer said the U.S. had organized its security strategy around geographic regions, each of which included a high-level commander who was meant to expedite communication and cooperation between the U.S. and a region's countries. He noted that this arrangement also seemed to work well for the Russian defense ministry.

¶8. (SBU) Ulyanov also observed that EUCOM had cooperated with and trained Georgia's military for many years, and that Georgia "had used that training not only in Iraq but also in South Ossetia." Had EUCOM drawn any conclusions or made any changes in its cooperation with Georgia as a result of "the events in August?" Schafer noted that Georgia had provided the third largest contingent to coalition forces in Iraq, after the U.S. and the UK. As to the future, EUCOM would "look at the best way forward based on the circumstances."

Cyber Security Workshop

¶9. (SBU) Estonia announced it had "taken account" of all the suggestions it had received on the draft decision for the agenda and modalities of the March 2009 cyber security workshop (FSC.DEL/177/09/Rev.1). Russia informed it lacked instructions and asked for more time to study the proposal.

The chair said it wanted the decision adopted before the end of the autumn session on December 17 and will reissue the paper as a chair's draft decision.

Single Deadline for Defense Planning Information

¶10. (SBU) Russia announced that it had received suggestions from Germany on the proposal for a single deadline for submission of Vienna Document defense planning information (FSC.DEL/494/07/Rev.3/Corr.1). The edits would align the proposal more closely with the text of the Vienna Document. Russia will issue a revised draft to take account of these suggestions shortly. (FSC.DEL/494/07/Rev.4)

AIAM Agenda

¶11. (SBU) The chair urged adopting of the French-authored
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agenda and modalities for the 2009 Annual Implementation Meeting (FSC.DEL/179/08). The paper will be reissued as a chair's draft decision. No delegation made comment.

Code of Conduct

¶12. (SBU) Belarus wants to substitute the Helsinki Final Act for the existing reference to the UN Charter in the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft decision on an update of the Code of Conduct questionnaire (FSC.DD/14/08) and include a new paragraph in the preamble on the indivisibility of security. (FSC.DEL/186/08) Denmark and Sweden immediately signaled concern over deletion of the UN Charter language. The chair recalled that the UN Charter reference was included to capture the concerns of some delegations for gender issues.

¶13. (SBU) Colonel Anton Eischer (Austria), the FSC Code of Conduct coordinator, announced his intention to turn to the third "cluster," "supplementary proposals," while awaiting further developments on the Code questionnaire. Germany (Schweizer) applauded this, noting its own supplementary proposal for regular review of the Code.

Vienna Document Inspectors' Visas

¶14. (SBU) The UK (Gare) proposed to NATO delegations they issue a "statement of concern" over a recent change to Russian visa procedures for Vienna Document inspectors that would affect the UK, Canada, and the U.S., as well as some other participating States. Russia now requires visas be obtained from a Russian consulate in the inspecting state if it will use points of entry (POE) other than Moscow, St. Petersburg, or Kaliningrad (refs A and B).

¶15. (SBU) Gare suggested that paras 88 and 121 of the Vienna Document 1999 allow the receiving state to change the POE even after the inspecting state has designated one. This might mean a UK inspector intending to enter Russia via Moscow could be denied entry if Russia were to change the POE to, e.g., Volgograd, which would require a visa issued in London rather than the "plane-side" visa available in Moscow. Mission requests Washington indicate if it would be interested in joining the "statement of concern."

Next Meeting

¶16. (SBU) The next meeting of the FSC on December 10 will feature Security Dialogue presentations by Ambassador Jorge Urbina, chairman of the UN Security Council Committee established under Resolution 1540, and Ambassador Lubomir Kopaj, the OSCE project coordinator in Ukraine, on rehabilitation of areas affected by explosive remnants of

war. There will be no FSC meeting on December 3 because of the Ministerial Council meetings in Helsinki, December 1-5.
SCOTT